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I. INTRODUCTION 
Any understanding or review of the current juvenile court in 
Minnesota must begin with a basic discussion of the manner in 
which society has viewed children and families.  More specifically, 
in order to understand the “juvenile court philosophy,” it is critical 
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School.  He is a founding member of the law firm of Walling, Berg & Debele, P.A.  
He is the immediate Past President of the American Academy of Adoption 
Attorneys and focuses his practice in all areas of juvenile and family law. 
       ††  Stacia Walling Driver is a 2003 graduate of William Mitchell College of 
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focuses on juvenile and family law issues. 
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for the reader to be aware that juvenile court, and in particular, 
juvenile court jurisdiction, includes a potpourri of issues dealing 
with children and families which do not otherwise fit neatly within 
the confines of other court processes.  Children’s issues do not fit 
well within the purview of the financially-oriented family court; nor 
do they fit within the purview of probate court.  Historically, no 
processes or laws conveyed jurisdiction or authority to the court to 
allow it to deal with and assist children suffering from abuse or 
neglect, or children who committed acts which—if committed by 
an adult—would be viewed as criminal. 
Throughout the course of the last 100 years, society’s attitude, 
as reflected in the “juvenile court philosophy,” shifted toward 
rehabilitation assistance and away from punitive actions directed at 
children.1  That philosophy is apparent now that the juvenile court 
is responsible for a variety of juvenile and family issues such as: 
disintegration of the family through termination of parental rights; 
rehabilitation of families involved in neglect, dependency, and 
Child in Need of Protection Services (CHIPS) cases; creation of 
families through adoption and foster care placement; and financial 
assistance to families through various programs like adoption 
assistance and foster care payments directed at specific needs of 
families and children. 
Separation of criminal laws from laws controlling dependent 
and neglected children was not particularly clear during the early 
stages of the “juvenile court philosophy.”  The result has been, in 
some ways, a continuing struggle within the juvenile court itself to 
deal with all aspects of family structure, creation, disintegration, 
and assistance. 
This Article looks at some of the historical developments that 
have led to the current procedures and status of the juvenile courts 
in Minnesota.2  In addition, it briefly reviews the development of 
procedural due process within the juvenile court, and its impact on 
the substantive issues that these courts are forced to deal with on a 
day-to-day basis.3  Finally, this Article argues that the issues dealt 
with by the juvenile court in Minnesota are some of the most 
important dealt with by any court system and they deserve a 
substantial influx of commitment, time, money, and expertise.4 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. See infra Parts II-VI. 
 3. See infra Parts VII-VIII. 
 4. See infra Part IX. 
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 
“JUVENILE COURT PHILOSOPHY” 
It is easy to ignore the historical background of society’s view 
of children and families when looking at the current situation in 
juvenile court.  Nonetheless, it is helpful to remember that the 
current approaches to children and families developed over 
hundreds of years preceding the formal creation of juvenile courts 
and statutes in Minnesota and other states.5  As noted by French 
historian Philip Aries in Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of 
Family Life, significant trends in both medieval and early modern 
Europe later filtered into American society and dramatically 
affected how children were treated within the American court 
system.6 
It is clear that in medieval times, the concepts of family and 
childhood as we know them today did not actually exist.7  Rather, 
during the Middle Ages, and for significant periods of time after 
that, nothing in the behavior, activities, or other social involvement 
of children distinguished them from adults.8  By the age of five, 
children were expected to join adults in household chores, work in 
family fields and shops, and participate in other adult activities.9  
Very few programs existed to assist troubled children or troubled 
families, or to help children escape from either their own behavior 
or the consequences of being abused or neglected.10 
During the late seventeenth century, as Christianity focused 
more on living a moral and good life, an underlying transformation 
began.  This transformation included the notions that morality and 
proper behavior had to be taught to children, and that abused 
children should be removed from what might be viewed as the 
corrupt world of adults.11  As a result, many middle class children 
began to have more and more extended schooling, and this new 
 
 5. See generally PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (chronicling the concept of 
childhood and the development of the family from the Middle Ages through the 
twentieth century). 
 6. Id. at 9-11. 
 7. Id. at 128. 
 8. See id. at 50, 71. 
 9. Id. at 329. 
 10. See, e.g., Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private CHIPS Petition in 
Minnesota: The Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or 
Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1994). 
 11. See ARIÈS, supra note 5, at 369. 
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focus on educating children was accompanied by a heightened 
interest in their well-being.12  Parents began to watch over their 
children rather than incorporate them into the work model of 
assisting the family with its chores.13  Parents began to promote 
their children’s health and safety, and tried to prevent momentarily 
abandoning them to the care of another family.14  By the 
eighteenth century, the child became the center of the middle class 
family.15 
In this context, in early America, including colonial America, 
the nuclear family eventually replaced the extended family as the 
fundamental unit, enhancing the relationship between children 
and parents.16  Children’s needs and futures became the focus of 
family life.17 
Most families were initially tied to small communities, causing 
family structure to become quite patriarchal; similar historical 
trends can be seen throughout colonial America.18  As with all 
historical developments, the birth of children and subsequent 
marriage of offspring were often driven by economic and social 
conditions more than emotional factors.19  However, the distinctive 
shift to the focus on children was remarkable.  As a direct 
outgrowth of this attitude, and particularly the background of 
closely knit families and communities, the Puritans of colonial 
Massachusetts enacted the first laws anywhere in the world to 
address what they called “unnatural severity” to children.20  This 
continued to reflect the family’s role as a primary unit in the social 
control of the colony.21 
Officials were often quick to intervene when the welfare of 
children seemed imperiled by the conduct of their parents.22  This 
 
 12. Id. at 369-71. 
 13. Id. at 369. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 398-400. 
 17. Id. at 403. 
 18. PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND FAMILY IN 
COLONIAL ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 73 (1970). 
 19. Id. at 74. 
 20. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987). 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE 
COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29 (1986).  But see Mason P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse 
and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. 
REV. 293, 300 (1972) (noting that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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often resulted in an attempt by governments to protect innocent 
children and to punish parents, causing children to be separated 
from their parents by institutionalization or apprenticeship.23  
Institutionalized children were often mixed with the homeless, 
mentally ill, mentally retarded, and other persons deemed unable 
to adequately care for themselves.24  Apprenticeships brought an 
economic component to this philosophy by providing inexpensive 
sources of labor in society, as well as a means for teaching children 
skills for use as adults.25 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these 
attitudes began to shift.  The impact of the westward expansion of 
the colonies, and the increasingly diverse ethnic and religious 
backgrounds of new immigrants, had a significant influence on the 
attitudes of government and society in both secular and religious 
practices, making attitudes more diverse and society less 
homogeneous.26  The church began to play an increasingly smaller 
role in “punishing” those viewed as moral offenders.27  At the same 
time, however, the expansion of secularism and individual rights 
tended to undermine the State’s authority to intervene in private 
matters.28  The transformative social factors of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries gave rise to the so called 
“republican family.”29  The family became smaller in size and more 
of the family’s attention and resources focused on child rearing.30 
Society began to recognize the nurturing role families could 
play by surrounding children with love and providing examples of 
proper behavior and values.31  Expanding upon the philosophies of 
John Locke, a growing humanitarian sentiment popularized the 
idea of “Christian Nurture.”32  Nurturing, rather than hard work, 
became not only the hallmark of the middle class childhood, but 
 
centuries, courts rarely intervened against harsh discipline). 
 23. Thomas, supra note 22, at 299. 
 24. Id. at 301. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See PLECK, supra note 20, at 31-32. 
 27. Id. at 31. 
 28. Id. at 31-33. 
 29. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-9 (G. Edward White ed., 1985). 
 30. Id. at 6-8. 
 31. Id. at 111. 
 32. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF 
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 111 (6th ed. 1999). 
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also the sought after model.33  Public interest in nurturing and 
protecting children became the focal point during the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century, a period of American history 
known as the Progressive Era.34 
The Progressive Era saw the emergence of wealthy urban elite 
who were “fearful of social disorder and dismayed by the poverty, 
disease, and lawlessness of urban life.”35  During the nineteenth 
century, public interest focused on child abuse and neglect, as the 
progressives of that time attempted to establish numerous 
innovative institutions to address the needs of what they considered 
“neglected, destitute, abandoned, and vagrant children.”36  By the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, organizations such as the 
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
(NYSPCC) attempted to respond to these conditions on behalf of 
neglected and abused children and specifically sought to locate 
and rescue them from their situations.37 
Eventually, the NYSPCC acquired specific police powers and 
heavy influence over the removal of children from their parents’ 
control.38  In fact, legislation authorized the NYSPCC to “file 
complaints for the violation of any laws affecting children” and 
“required law enforcement and court officials to aid agents of the 
[NYSPCC] in the enforcement of these laws.”39  They also 
investigated and advised judges regarding the disposition and 
placement of children who were poor, neglected, or involved in 
delinquent acts.40   
During this period of time, the line between a child’s own 
actions and his parents’ actions became blurred.  Agents of private 
societies were authorized to arrest “anyone found violating statutes 
regarding children, or obstructing or interfering with the work of 
the society’s [sic] agents.”41  Between 1875 and 1900, many cities 
created similar cruelty prevention groups in an attempt to remove 
children from the poverty and abuse seen as restricting their ability 
 
 33. Id. at 110-11. 
 34. Id. 
 35. PLECK, supra note 20, at 70. 
 36. Thomas, supra note 22, at 306. 
 37. Id. at 310. 
 38. Id. at 310-11. 
 39. Id. at 310.  For statutory authority see 1881 N.Y. Laws 69-72, ch. 676, § 
293, reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 193-
95 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971). 
 40. Thomas, supra note 22, at 310. 
 41. PLECK, supra note 20, at 81. 
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to become productive members of society in general.42  During this 
time, progressives believed that “[b]y providing the child[ren] with 
a healthy, moral, and secure home environment, adequate 
schooling, and humane working conditions . . . a future American 
society largely untroubled by vice, crime . . . poverty . . . [c]lass 
antagonisms, ethnic divisions, and racial tensions would 
[emerge].”43  This world view prompted compulsory education 
laws, new schools and vocational institutions, restructured 
curricula, and restrictions on child labor.  It also led to the 
establishment of the federal Children’s Bureau and, of particular 
significance, the creation of the first juvenile court in the United 
States.44 
III. JUVENILE COURTS CREATED 
The creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois, in 
1899 is viewed as a seminal development in the field of child 
welfare.45  Of significant importance is the potpourri of issues 
within juvenile court jurisdiction.  Even at that time, both 
neglected children and child offenders were subject to dispositions, 
entrustment, and often committal to the same institution, 
regardless of how they came to be before the court.46  This raised 
significant questions regarding the constitutional validity of 
juvenile proceedings, as did the general lack of procedure and due 
process.47 
As the progressive view of family and children continued to 
become focused, “[t]he juvenile court movement in the United 
States gathered momentum in the final years of the nineteenth 
century.”48  In April of 1899, Illinois passed the first juvenile court 
 
 42. See SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 78 (1982) (explaining that proponents of institutions argued that 
“in New York, Chicago, and other cities throughout the country, thousands of 
children owed their livelihood and happiness to the educational and training 
facilities of [institutions]”). 
 43. Id. at 7-8. 
 44. Id. at 8. 
 45. Thomas, supra note 22, at 323. 
 46. Id. at 315. 
 47. Id.; see infra Part IV.  “The 1899 juvenile court law continued the blurring 
of distinctions between neglected, dependent, and delinquent children and the 
practice of mixing these children in the same institutions—sometimes under 
repressive and punitive conditions.”  Id. at 324. 
 48. MONRAD G. PAULSEN & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 1 (N. Corinne Smith ed., 1974). 
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act.49  The act was spearheaded by reformers who were deeply 
interested in a variety of social causes, including prison reform, 
employment issues, women’s suffrage, and poverty law.  The 
passionate conviction of these reformers to protect children from 
the disadvantages of a criminal conviction also propelled the 
enactment of the juvenile court law.50 
Of additional significance, the new court was designed to 
operate with great procedural informality—in the absence of a jury 
trial, public trial, and constitutionally guaranteed rights of any 
kind.51  In particular, it was noted that charges were not filed 
against a child but rather a petition was filed “in his interest.”52  The 
original Illinois Act provided that “‘the court shall proceed to hear 
and dispose of the case in a summary manner.’”53  The goal of the 
court was to find out why a child had misbehaved and to offer 
treatment to help him.  As noted by one of the great early Illinois 
judges, Julian Mack: 
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has 
this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is 
he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be 
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save 
him from a downward career.54 
In 1927, Herbert Lou noted that “[t]he juvenile court is 
conspicuously a response to the modern spirit of social justice.”55  
In many ways, a review of the current status of juvenile court 
reflects a continuing commitment to the “spirit of social justice.”56  
While the issues of neglected, dependent, and abused children 
remained high in the minds of the social reformers, statutes tended 
to focus on dealing with children charged with committing acts 
that would otherwise be criminal.  The creators of the juvenile 
court strongly believed that criminal statutes, which for hundreds 
of years had essentially viewed children as adults by the age of 
seven, were a total failure in deterring the criminal behavior of 
 
 49. Thomas, supra note 22, at 324. 
 50. Id. 
 51. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (quoting 1899 Ill. Laws 131-37). 
 54. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). 
 55. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927). 
 56. See id. (explaining that through the advent of juvenile courts “we have 
now socially-minded judges, who hear and adjust cases according not to rigid rules 
of law but to what the interests of society and the interests of the child or good 
conscience demand”). 
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children.57  Because crime was not suppressed, these reformers 
believed that the criminal law actually operated to harm children.58  
“The conviction . . . stigmatized the child for life”59 and offered no 
hope or opportunity for the child.60  A lengthy prison sentence, or 
even capital punishment, given to a child older than seven years of 
age had no deterrent effect, offered no assistance to the child, and 
therefore was deemed repugnant.61  Even children who managed to 
avoid imprisonment were failed by the system.  In the early 1900s, 
one commentator writing about delinquent children noted: 
The significant fact which must not be overlooked is that, 
even if [the child was] ‘let off’ by the justice or pardoned 
by the mayor, no constructive work was done in the child’s 
behalf . . . .  [W]hatever was done in the case was 
necessarily done with little or no relation to the child’s 
history or surroundings.62 
Therefore, it was necessary to restructure all of the criminal 
law in order to recognize that children themselves had no “free 
will” and therefore were not responsible for their misbehavior—in 
contrast to adults, who could in fact be rehabilitated through 
treatment.63 
As attitudes toward “criminal” behavior changed, so did the 
manner of dealing with children coming out of abusive, neglected, 
and dependent situations.  Initially there was a gray area in the 
development of various jurisdictional bases including truancy, 
incurability, and absenteeism from the home.64  All of these 
activities carried “criminal” penalties in delinquency proceedings, 
although they constituted lawful activities for adults.65 
The rehabilitative model became the standard approach for 
dealing with children.  This approach responded to the failures of 
criminal law and is reflected in the “juvenile court philosophy.”66  
Miriam Van Walters, a referee in the juvenile court in California in 
 
 57. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Julia C. Lathrop, Introduction to SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE & EDITH 
ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME 4 (Richard C. Wade ed., 1970) 
(1912). 
 63. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 1. 
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1923, noted, “the juvenile court is conceived in the spirit of the 
clinic.”67  The founders of juvenile courts specifically believed that 
“the behavioral sciences and the medical arts offered a body of 
scientific information which, if applied to an erring child, could 
work beneficial change in him.”68 
In both delinquency and child protection matters, the goal of 
“[t]he court was to meet the child’s needs, to serve his best 
interest[],” and rehabilitate him, rather than punish him.69  
Treatment was to be offered to meet the needs of the child and not 
adjusted as a means of imposing punishment based on the 
seriousness of the child’s act.70  The probation officer or social 
worker was at the heart of the entire juvenile justice system, acting 
as a counselor to the child and providing consistent contact 
between the court and the youth.71  The fundamental principle of 
the juvenile court was that 
[c]hildren are to be dealt with separately from adults. 
Their cases are to be heard at a different time and, 
preferably, in a different place; They are detained in 
separate buildings, and, if institutional guidance is 
necessary, they are to be committed to institutions for 
children through its probation officers which the court 
can keep in constant touch with the children who have 
appeared before it.  Taking children from their parents is, 
when possible, to be avoided; on the other hand, parental 
obligations are to be enforced.  The procedure of the 
court must be as informal as possible.  Its purpose is not to 
punish but to save.  It is to deal with children not as 
criminals but as persons in whose guidance and welfare of 
the State is particularly interested.  Save in the cases of 
adults, its jurisdiction is equitable, not, criminal in 
nature.72 
Further, juvenile courts integrate the science of human 
behavior to address juvenile delinquency.  On the topic of 
integrating the science of human behavior into the juvenile court 
 
 67. Miriam Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, in CRIME, 
ABNORMAL MINDS, & THE LAW 158 (Ernest B. Hoag & Edward H. Williams eds., Da 
Capo Press 1981) (1923). 
 68. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. BERNARD FLEXNER & REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT 8 (1922). 
10
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systems, Herbert Lou wrote: 
It is perhaps the first legal tribunal where law and science, 
especially the science of medicine and those sciences 
which deal with human behavior, such as biology, 
sociology, and psychology, work side by side.  It recognizes 
the fact that the law unaided is incompetent to decide 
what is adequate treatment of delinquency and crime.  It 
undertakes to define and readjust social situations without 
the sentiment of prejudice.  Its approach to the problem 
which the child presents is scientific, objective, and 
dispassionate.  The methods which it uses are those of 
social case work, in which every child is studied and 
treated as an individual.73 
Thus, the great social experiment of the juvenile court was 
under way—examining the results and promoting the involvement 
of the secular state within the lives of individual families—until the 
development of healthy families and rehabilitation could be 
achieved.  It swept the country, and by the early 1900s, every state 
in the union had passed some form of the juvenile court law.74  
From there, the spigot was opened to drop all aspects of children’s 
lives into the unending sponge of juvenile court jurisdiction. 
IV. PARENS PATRIAE TAKES ON DUE PROCESS 
Almost immediately after the creation of juvenile courts, 
concern arose over the paternalistic position of the courts, and the 
limitations on what many viewed as constitutional requirements for 
courts’ involvement in the lives of individuals.  It is clear that the 
founders of juvenile court were quite aware of the enormous power 
of this court.75  The power of the court to interfere with children 
and their parents, and in some cases to take children away and 
place them in disciplinary institutions, was clear.76  More 
specifically: 
The fact that the juvenile court exercised the power to 
take children from their parents and to commit children 
to state training schools by procedures that did not 
involve a jury or a public trial, the right to remain silent, 
the right to counsel and the rest, raised serious questions 
 
 73. LOU, supra note 55, at 2. 
 74. Thomas, supra note 22, at 327. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
11
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of constitutional law.  The power of the juvenile court to 
operate in this informal fashion was almost universally 
sustained in state courts by characterizing the proceedings 
as civil rather than criminal—an exercise of parens patriae 
power.77 
Many people characterized this power as punitive and 
indistinguishable from criminal dispositions.78  However, the court 
harkened back to early English law’s recognition of the residual 
power of the crown to protect children and what was referred to 
and continued to be referred to as the power of parens patriae.79  
The courts were unable to ignore these imperatives.  Using this 
power to protect children against the horrors of the criminal law, 
juvenile court dispositions provided a basis for a “civil proceeding” 
in which criminal sentences would be inapplicable.80   
Early cases invoked the doctrine of parens patriae as an effort to 
“protect children” from their own misbehavior and from adult 
wrongdoers.  The court opinions appear reluctant to force the legal 
analysis of juvenile courts into the framework of constitutional law, 
thus prohibiting or avoiding application of constitutional principles 
to these cases.81  As early as 1905, the Pennsylvania court stated: 
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from 
continuing in a career of crime, to end in maturer [sic] 
years in public punishment and disgrace, the Legislature 
surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its 
parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by 
bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any 
process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state’s 
guardianship and protection. . . . 
[T]he act is not for the trial of a child charged with a 
crime, but is mercifully to save it from such an ordeal, 
with the prison or penitentiary in its wake, if the child’s 
own good and the best interest of the state justify such 
salvation.  Whether the child deserves to be saved by the 
state is no more a question for a jury than whether than 
the father, if able to save it, ought to save it. . . . The act is 
but an exercise by the state of its supreme power over the 
welfare of children, a power under which it can take a 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. FLEXNER & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 72, at 8-9. 
 81. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 5. 
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child from its father and let it go where it will, without 
committing it to any guardianship or any institution, if the 
welfare of the child, taking its age into consideration, can 
be thus best promoted. . . .  
The design is not punishment, nor the restraint 
imprisonment, any more than is the wholesome restraint 
which a parent exercises over his child.82 
This sentiment was echoed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
1908: 
[The juvenile court’s] object is to confer a benefit both 
upon the child and the community in the way of 
surrounding the child with better and more elevating 
influences, and of educating and training him in the 
direction of good citizenship and thereby saving him to 
society and adding a good and useful citizen to the 
community. . . . It would be carrying the protection of 
“inalienable rights,” guaranteed by the Constitution, a 
long ways [sic] to say that the guaranty extends to a free 
and unlimited exercise of the whims, caprices, or 
proclivities of either a child or its parents or guardians for 
idleness, ignorance, crime, indigence, or any kindred 
dispositions or inclinations.83 
This philosophy, or parens patriae, which led to significant 
abuses, continued to be the order of the day in all aspects of 
juvenile law for almost seventy years, from the passing of the 1899 
Illinois statute until the Supreme Court decision in In re Gault.84  
Under the guise of the beneficent, the juvenile court judge sat at a 
table or desk, rather than on a bench.85  From the table, the judge 
dispensed justice to the needy children of society.  This became the 
norm, and was the basis for excluding essentially all constitutional 
rights or other due process protections for the child, as well as the 
family of a juvenile appearing before the court.  For approximately 
seventy-five percent of the existence of juvenile courts nationally, 
and Minnesota courts as well, this model was used with the 
overwhelming belief that it assisted both children and families.  
However, in reality, it promoted uninhibited interference—albeit 
oftentimes necessary intervention—in a child or family’s life, free 
 
 82. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200-01 (Pa. 1905). 
 83. Ex parte Sharp, 96 P. 563, 564-65 (Idaho 1908). 
 84. 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967); see also infra notes 152-69 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 54, at 120. 
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from the perceived encumbrances of due process.  Given such a 
system, abuse could not be far behind. 
V. THE EARLY MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE 
The first Minnesota juvenile court statute, enacted in 1905, 
reflected, as did most states, the social movements occurring at the 
national level, as originally exemplified by the 1899 Illinois 
statute.86  Early on, Minnesota began to address the needs of both 
its “delinquent children and its dependent and neglected 
children.”87 
The original juvenile court statutes reflected the same broad 
and sweeping power found in other states at the turn of the 
twentieth century.88  Even prior to that, however, the Minnesota 
courts had dealt with state involvement in family life, under earlier 
statutes.  As early as 1892, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State ex 
rel. Olson v. Brown, ruled on various 1878 statutes and amendments 
thereto.89  In Brown, an appeal of a lower court writ of habeas 
corpus directed at the Superintendent State Reform School, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether a 
child had been unlawfully restrained at the school.90  The case itself 
involved relatively technical issues of jurisdiction and a charge of 
“incorrigibly vicious conduct” where the child was “committed to 
the guardianship of the board of managers of the reform school.”91  
In dealing with the jurisdictional issues, the court also indicated 
that it was 
obliged to consider the relator’s contention that the 
legislation of this state, whereby justices are authorized 
and empowered to commit infants to the care and 
guardianship of the board of managers of the reform 
school in consequence of incorrigibly vicious conduct, 
and for a time exceeding three months, is not a valid 
exercise of legislative power, under the constitution of this 
state.92 
In specifically dealing with that question, the court noted: 
 
 86. See TIFFIN, supra note 42, at 7-8. 
 87. 1905 Minn. Laws 418. 
 88. Thomas, supra note 22, at 313-14. 
 89. 50 Minn. 353, 357-59, 52 N.W. 935, 936 (1892). 
 90. Id. at 356, 52 N.W. at 935. 
 91. Id., 52 N.W. at 935. 
 92. Id. at 357, 52 N.W. at 936. 
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The questions raised by the first of these propositions 
have often been discussed by the judicial tribunals of this 
country.  Legislation which, brushing aside and 
disregarding the views, wishes, or supposed rights of 
natural guardians, has had for its object the future welfare 
of the minor children of incapable and unworthy parents, 
or the care, custody, and proper training of incorrigible 
and vicious youth by the state, has occasionally been 
denounced with great vigor by the courts.  A notable 
example of this species of denunciation may be found in 
the opinion in People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 281, written by Mr. 
Justice Thornton.  But legislation of this character has 
been adopted in nearly all of the northern states, and its 
validity has often been upheld.  We do not propose to add 
to the very many pages which, in the Reports and text-
books, have been devoted to the support of the position, 
now taken almost universally by the courts, that a person 
committed to the care and custody of a board in charge of an 
institution of the character of the Minnesota state reform school is 
not “punished,” nor is he “imprisoned,” in the ordinary meaning 
of those words.  Hence the constitutional provision which 
regulates and limits the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in 
criminal matters has no application.93 
More specifically, in quoting from the Wisconsin case of 
Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors of Milwaukee County,94 the 
Brown court repeated: 
And, in the first place, we cannot understand that the 
detention of the child at one of these schools should be 
considered as imprisonment, any more than its detention 
in the poorhouse,—any more than the detention of any 
child at any boarding school, standing, for the time, in 
loco parentis to the child.  Parental authority implies 
restraint, not imprisonment. And every school must 
necessarily exercise some measure of parental power of 
restraint over children committed to it.  And when the 
state, as parens patriae, is compelled, by the misfortune of a 
child, to assume for it parental duty, and to charge itself 
with its nurture, it is compelled also to assume parental 
authority over it. . . . And, in exercising a wholesome 
parental restraint over the child, it can be properly said to 
imprison the child no more than the tenderest parent exercising 
 
 93. Id., 52 N.W. at 936 (emphasis added). 
 94. 40 Wis. 328, 337 (1876). 
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like power of restraint over children.  This seems too plain to 
need authority; but the cases cited for the respondent and 
others amply sustain our view.95 
Thus, even prior to the codification of the 1899 statute in 
Illinois, Minnesota courts supported the ability of the justice of the 
peace and the municipal courts to remove children from their 
homes for active “incorrigibility” or other acts resulting from being 
an abused, neglected, or dependent child.  Constitutional 
objections were swiftly set aside and disregarded.  Nevertheless, the 
early statute did reflect some debate over whether it was the 
responsibility of the State or the family to protect and punish 
dependent and neglected children in particular.  The 1905 statute 
was designated as “an act as to regulate the treatment and control 
of dependent, and neglected and delinquent children.”96  One 
commentator has noted: 
While recognizing the authority and control of the state 
through its courts, the 1905 statutes specifically allowed 
any reputable person to file a petition alleging that a child 
was neglected or dependent as long as that person resided 
in the county and knew of the child who appeared to be 
neglected or dependent.97 
Thus, the State recognized implicit gray areas when courts are 
required to evaluate cases related to children, whether resulting 
from abuse and neglect or from their own criminal or incorrigible 
behavior. 
Such protective statutes clearly drew on the courts’ long 
history—extending back to the colonial era—of providing any 
interested person in the community the ability to alert authorities 
to family problems.98  The statutes allowed a combination of state 
response and private action in dealing with families and their 
children’s “best interest.”  Again, however, the early stages of the 
statutes provided few, if any, procedural protections for children.99  
Although early statutes recognized the relationship between the 
court’s authority and the family’s responsibilities, provisions such as 
 
 95. Brown, 50 Minn. at 358, 52 N.W. at 936 (emphasis added). 
 96. 1905 Minn. Laws 418. 
 97. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 803; see also 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 419-
20. 
 98. See Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 785-802 (providing a more 
detailed historical discussion of the U.S. government’s approach to child 
protection). 
 99. MINN. STAT. § 44 (1878). 
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those allowing any “reputable person” to bring a matter before the 
court highlighted the controversy over whether society or the 
family was most responsible, and best fit, to address the needs of a 
particular dependent or neglected child. 100 
In 1912, Governor Burnquist appointed a twelve-person group 
called the “Minnesota Child Welfare Commission” to recommend 
revisions of all state laws, including the juvenile laws affecting 
children.101  Other proposals included midwife regulation laws, 
educational scheme improvements, child labor law evaluation, 
provisions for state guardianship of illegitimate children, and 
paternity establishment laws to hold fathers responsible for their 
children.102  The commission also proposed some modifications of 
the delinquency laws.103 
The jurisdictional basis for involvement of children in the 
juvenile court continued to be amended and discussed.  In 1913, 
“habitual truant” appeared for the first time in the juvenile court 
statutes, but only in the definition of the “delinquent” child and 
not in the definition of “neglected” or dependent child.104  
Apparently, the law continued to be unable to distinguish between 
a child’s actions and treatment for victimization of that child. 
Significant change occurred during the 1917 legislative 
session.  An early law review article in this area, written by Judge 
Edward F. Waite of the Hennepin County Juvenile Court, discussed 
the imposition of these new laws.105  Judge Waite stated that “[w]e 
live in what has been aptly termed ‘the century of the child.’  Never 
before have the obligations of society to its more helpless members 
been so generally recognized; and of all forms of helplessness that 
of childhood makes the strongest and most universal appeal.”106  In 
addition, in listing what he viewed as impressive accomplishments 
by the State of Minnesota in addressing these needs of children, he 
included the creation of a reform school for young offenders, 
schools for the deaf and blind, the juvenile courts in 1905, a state 
 
 100. See id.; 1905 Minn. Laws 418, 419-20; Thomas, supra note 22, at 315. 
 101. Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. REV. 48, 51-
52 (1917). 
 102. Id. at 53-56. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 1913 Minn. Laws 356, 357. 
 105. Waite, supra note 101, at 48 (discussing the importance in revising the 
Minnesota laws concerning child welfare).  Judge Waite was the chairman of the 
Minnesota Child Welfare Commission, “appointed by the Governor to revise and 
codify the laws of Minnesota relating to children.”  Id. at 62 n.1. 
 106. Id. at 48. 
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hospital for crippled children in 1907, and “mothers’ pensions” in 
1913.107  These programs largely reflect the developments occurring 
in other states during the Progressive Era. 
Viewing the juvenile court from a modern social work 
approach rather than an institutional approach, Judge Waite 
clearly supported the Minnesota legislature’s effort to modernize 
the State’s treatment of neglected, dependent, delinquent, and 
abused children.  Minnesota was clearly one of the most progressive 
states, certainly in the vanguard of the reform trends of the early 
1900s.108  Nevertheless, despite these high ideals and lofty goals, the 
questions of due process and the right of the State and the courts 
to intervene in the lives of children and families continue to be 
raised in the court system. 
In 1922, the Minnesota Supreme Court, once again dealing 
with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, struggled with its view of 
the constitutional issues.109  In that case, fifteen-year-old Alice 
Peterson was adjudged a “delinquent child” in the Hennepin 
County Juvenile Court and committed to the County Home School 
for Girls.110  More specifically, she was charged with “willfully, 
unlawfully, and wrongfully” refusing to attend school despite being 
enrolled in the public school.111  Based on Ms. Peterson’s refusal to 
attend school, she was brought before the court.112  As a result of 
her truancy disposition, she was detained at the County Home 
School for Girls, and subsequently a writ of habeas corpus was 
issued on the petition of the mother.113 
Based on previous case law and its application to “dependent 
and neglected children,” the Appellant conceded that the act and 
the ability to hold the child in such circumstances and for such 
purposes was constitutional.114  However, the Appellant argued that 
delinquent children are claimed to be in another class . . . 
[and] when children commit crime the state cannot lay 
hold of them, except by due process of law, as usually 
administered by criminal courts under our Constitutions, 
state and federal; for a child may no more than an adult 
 
 107. Id. at 48-49. 
 108. See id. at 48. 
 109. Ex parte Peterson, 151 Minn. 467, 468, 187 N.W. 226, 226 (1922). 
 110. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 111. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 112. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 113. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 114. Id. at 469, 187 N.W. at 226. 
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be deprived of liberty or punished for crime without a 
trial in the ordinary way by jury.115 
In rejecting that argument, the court once again blurred the 
lines between children being victims of abuse and neglect and 
being responsible for their own actions.116  The court also blurred 
the line between what was “criminal law” in nature and what was 
delinquent, which includes actions taken by the child which would 
not be a crime if taken by an adult.117  More specifically, the court 
reasoned: 
The principle is now rather firmly established that, for its 
protection and the good of the child, the state may, 
through its courts, place the child in charge of some 
person or institution for proper training and support.  It 
matters little whether the danger to the child and society 
comes because of the fault of others or that of the child.  
The right of the state to step in and save the child is the 
same.  In that view the restraint put upon the child cannot 
be regarded as punishment for crime . . . when it is 
necessary for state to step in and perform the parental 
duty the liberty of the child may circumscribed.  In this 
case the petition under which the juvenile court acted did not 
charge Alice with a crime.  Indeed, definition of delinquency in 
the act includes matters other than crimes. 118 
In reaffirming the law from earlier cases, the court stated that 
“adjudging a child delinquent and committing it to the custody of a 
state appointed guardian was not an imprisonment or punishment 
for crime.”119  Reflecting on its early decision, the court noted that 
“the procedure which permitted a child to be committed to the reform school 
without a jury trial was also held not repugnant to constitutional 
guaranties.”120 
Once again reflecting the view of the statutes and the social 
movement from the late 1900s, the court noted that the tenor of 
the act indicates the sole purpose is the welfare of the delinquent 
as well as a dependent or neglected child.121  That is, the treatment 
 
 115. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 116. See id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 117. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. 
 118. Id., 187 N.W. at 226. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id., 187 N.W. at 226-27. 
 120. Id., 187 N.W. at 227 (discussing State ex rel. Olson v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 
52 N.W. 935 (1892) (emphasis added)). 
 121. Id. at 470, 187 N.W. at 227. 
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is, and should be, essentially the same.122  In supporting the broad 
discretion of the juvenile court to deal with children as it saw fit, 
the court concluded: “[w]e considered chapter 397, L.1917 
designed to secure the welfare of delinquent children, and not to 
punish them, and the restraint put on them to secure that end is 
not imprisonment, but parental control by the state in cases where 
parents have failed.”123  Thus, the parens patriae magnificent view of 
the State, in contravention of all procedural and constitutional due 
process, won the day.  This philosophy of dealing with the 
children’s “best interest” regardless of the reason that brought 
them before the juvenile court continued essentially unabated and 
unfettered for the next fifty years until the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
reviewing the abuses of such a system, decided that perhaps 
children should have some constitutional due process rights. 124 
VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND DUE PROCESS REAR THEIR UGLY HEADS 
IN CONTRAVENTION OF FULL UNFETTERED DISCRETION BY THE 
JUVENILE COURT 
A. Historical Application of Due Process Rights in Juvenile Court  
As with other issues in society, it took many years for the 
conflict between parens patriae and due process to percolate up to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.125  In reviewing the timing on the 
significant changes that have impacted the juvenile court during 
the most recent twenty-five percent of its existence, it is important 
to note that, in the criminal law context, the Supreme Court did 
not create or articulate many of the rights associated with due 
process and limitation of government intervention in citizens’ lives 
until the late 1960s.  In particular, the first eight amendments to 
the Constitution—including the portion of the Bill of Rights 
reflecting criminal procedure requirements—were only applied 
directly through the Fourteenth Amendment and due process to 
the states in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio.126  The Supreme Court has 
 
 122. Id., 187 N.W. at 227. 
 123. Id., 187 N.W. at 227. 
 124. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).  “Fit parents act in their 
children’s best interests and there is normally no reason for the State to inject 
itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to 
make the best decisions regarding their children.”  Id. 
 125. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 4-5, 134. 
 126. 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961). 
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applied the Fourteenth Amendment limitations on the power of 
the states to the right against self-incrimination,127 the right to 
counsel,128 the right to speedy trial,129 the right to public trial,130 the 
right to confront opposing witnesses,131 compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses,132 the right to trial by jury,133 and the right to be 
free from double jeopardy.134  Thus, the application of these 
otherwise basic constitutional rights in state proceedings and basic 
criminal law was firmly established by the late 1960s.  It is not 
particularly unusual then, that the coming of due process in one 
form or another to the juvenile court was delayed even further 
beyond its application to adults.  Having decided that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires full application of due process to 
state proceedings, the Supreme Court then began to turn to the 
separate and otherwise independent juvenile court system. 
For almost seventy years “young persons were adjudicated 
delinquent, dependent, and neglected [during] informal 
proceedings less protective of [their] individual rights than those 
available to an adult criminal.”135  Then, in 1966, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the first of several juvenile court cases on the issue 
of due process in Kent v. United States.136  In Kent, Morris Kent 
became involved in the juvenile court in the District of Columbia at 
the young age of fourteen.137  He was apprehended because of 
several house breakings and attempted purse snatching.138  While 
on probation from earlier offenses, sixteen-year-old Kent was 
charged with new allegations and, under the District of Columbia 
statute, “waived” from the juvenile court jurisdiction into the adult 
court jurisdiction, thus making possible an adult criminal trial and 
criminal sentencing.139  The judge, in accordance with the statute 
and the approved practice in the district “held no hearing, made 
 
 127. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964). 
 128. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963). 
 129. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). 
 130. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). 
 131. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
 132. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18, 23 (1967). 
 133. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). 
 134. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). 
 135. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 12. 
 136. 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 546.  Rather than ruling on the motions, the juvenile court judge 
rendered an order declaring jurisdiction of the petitioner to be waived.  Id. 
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no findings and gave no reasons [whatsoever] for his action.”140  His 
ruling was exclusively based on his personal estimate of Morris 
Kent’s “amenability to treatment under the facilities” of the 
juvenile court.141  Waived from juvenile court, Kent was tried by a 
jury and found not guilty by reason of insanity as to a rape charge, 
but guilty on six counts of house breaking.142  The Supreme Court 
vacated the conviction based on the “waiver proceeding” in the 
juvenile court.143 
In the first case of its kind involving a child, the Supreme 
Court in Kent established a standard of due process, taken from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and applied it to juvenile proceedings.144  
As history has shown, and perhaps not surprisingly given the fact 
that juvenile courts are and were by that point agencies of the 
government, some juvenile court judges continued to argue that 
due process had no place whatsoever in a court for children.145  
Kent settled the point and Mr. Justice Fortis speaking for the 
Supreme Court stated, “[W]e . . . hold that the hearing must 
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”146 
B. Due Process Rights and Requirements Begin to Assault the Historical 
Juvenile Court Philosophy 
During the next five or six years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
began to take its most active role in juvenile court proceedings to 
date.  All measures of requests for applications of “due process” 
rights to juvenile proceedings were brought before the courts, and 
in general, the majority of “criminal rights” were also applied to 
juvenile respondents in delinquency proceedings.  While Kent was 
technically an opinion regarding statutes in the District of 
Columbia, there is little doubt that it was a predecessor and the 
beginning of later endorsements of various due process rights 
including such things as a right to counsel.147  More specifically, in 
support of later analysis, the Kent Court stated: 
 
 140. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kent, 383 U.S. at 550. 
 143. Id. at 564-65.  The Court remanded the case to the district court to 
conduct a hearing de novo regarding the propriety of the waiver order.  Id. at 565. 
 144. Id. at 557. 
 145. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13. 
 146. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. 
 147. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 13-14. 
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In these circumstances, considering particularly that 
decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the 
matter to the District Court was potentially as important to 
petitioner as the difference between five years’ 
confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a 
condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner as entitled to 
a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social 
records and probation or similar reports which 
presumably are considered by the court, and to a 
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.  We 
believe that this result is required by the statute read in 
the context of constitutional principles relating to due 
process and the assistance of counsel.148 
Thus, Kent was based on an interpretation of statutes of the 
District of Columbia and did not specifically rest on constitutional 
grounds.  It nonetheless provided a fresh breath of air on the due 
process arguments leading to several subsequent decisions. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court held that the fact finding or 
adjudicatory hearing was to be measured by due process 
standards.149  In such cases, it held that those standards require 
adequate, timely, written notice of the allegations against the 
juvenile respondent.150  The Court also held that in all cases where 
juveniles were faced with the possible danger of loss of liberty 
because of commitment, due process requires that the juvenile 
have the right to counsel,151 the privilege against self 
incrimination,152 and the right to confront and cross-examine 
opposing witnesses under oath.153 
This particular case arose from an allegation in the juvenile 
court in Arizona where neither Gerald Gault, then fifteen years old, 
nor his mother were given adequate notice of the charge against 
him.154  The charge was for allegedly making obscene phone calls to 
a neighbor.155  Neither the child nor his mother were informed of 
his right to counsel, his privilege against self incrimination, or his 
right to confrontation.156  Nevertheless, Gerald Gault was 
 
 148. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557. 
 149. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967). 
 150. Id. at 33-34. 
 151. Id. at 41. 
 152. Id. at 55. 
 153. Id. at 56. 
 154. Id. at 33. 
 155. Id. at 4. 
 156. Id. at 34, 42. 
23
Walling and Driver: 100 Years of Juvenile Court in Minnesota—A Historical Overview an
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
03WALLING.DOC 4/5/2006  1:27:03 PM 
906 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
adjudicated delinquent and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed 
the appeal.157   
In reversing the Arizona conviction, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its position with respect to due process as stated in 
Kent.158  On the specific issue, as noted, the Gault opinion holds that 
the respondent in the juvenile court and his parents are entitled to 
written notice of the specific charge and the factual allegation to be 
considered at the hearing.159  Because the child’s adjudication as a 
delinquent rested on an admission by him at the juvenile court 
hearing and he was not advised of his right against self 
incrimination, that he did not need to testify,160 or that he had a 
right to counsel,161 the conviction was reversed.162  In referring to 
the Kent decision, the Gault Court stated that “the assistance of 
counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we now 
hold that it is equally essential for the determination of 
delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of 
incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age 
of [twenty-one].”163  With respect to self incrimination, the Court 
stated that “[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privileging of self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to 
children.”164 
Despite the Gault decision, not everyone was in agreement.  In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart noted that the Court had 
invited a “long step backwards into the nineteenth century,” 
denying that juvenile court proceedings were a criminal trial.165  
Further, there were in fact reasons why the elementary issue of 
specific notice of a hearing was disregarded by the Arizona courts.  
Justice Stewart further noted in his dissent that “a juvenile 
proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the 
mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court.  The 
object of one is a correction of a condition.  The object of the 
other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.”166 
 
 157. Id. at 9-10. 
 158. Id. at 30-31. 
 159. Id. at 33. 
 160. Id. at 55-56. 
 161. Id. at 42. 
 162. Id. at 59. 
 163. Id. at 36-37. 
 164. Id. at 47. 
 165. Id. at 79-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. at 79. 
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It was the opinion of many juvenile court judges at that time 
that notice in advance of the proceeding would “serve to stigmatize 
the child before trial.”167  They believed that the notifying 
document would “find its way into court records and may be read 
by many persons, thus affecting the child’s reputation.”168  The 
motive of the judges was in fact a beneficent one with respect to the 
children.  However, the main point of Gault is that the stated 
purpose to help and benefit or protect a child, while failing to 
provide reasons for any decision, is not a basis to deny the 
safeguards available to adult offenders.  The issues of the 
stigmatization and resulting confidentiality of proceedings, 
charges, and records, while beyond the scope of this Article, do in 
fact raise significant constitutional, legal and ethical, and 
procedural and philosophical issues, as society’s view of that issue 
has changed dramatically in all aspects of juvenile court. 
In reviewing the Gault and Kent decisions, it is important to 
note that both of them signify great skepticism as to whether or not 
the often restated juvenile court goals of rehabilitation and child 
rescue were in fact close to or being realized in any situation.  As 
Paulsen and Whitebread have stated: 
The Gault and Kent opinions both embrace the view that 
the juvenile court’s aim of rehabilitative treatment has 
fallen short of accomplishment either because resources 
have not been made available to the court’s program or 
because the goals of the juvenile court movement are 
beyond the present ability of society to achieve.  Gault and 
Kent deny that important rehabilitative values are 
undercut by requiring constitutional procedures.169 
Thus, instead of defining the issue as a conflict between due 
process and parens patriae, the Gault and Kent courts, both opinions 
written by Justice Fortis, state the position that both can exist 
simultaneously to provide the best of both worlds on behalf of 
children. 
In expressing this general view and hope, Justice Fortis 
nevertheless had strong words for the system.  Specifically, he 
stated, “[t]here is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for 
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he 
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous 
 
 167. PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD, supra note 48, at 15. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 18. 
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care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”170 
In even stronger terms, in the Gault opinion Justice Fortis 
speaks of the gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of 
the child.171  He stated: 
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy 
does not justify a kangaroo court.  The traditional ideas of 
Juvenile Court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time 
would be available and care would be used to establish 
precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it—was it a 
prank of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious 
consequences to himself or society unless corrected?  
Under traditional notions, one would assume that in a 
case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile appears 
to have a home, a working mother and father, and an 
older brother, the Juvenile Judge would have made a 
careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the 
boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite 
his previous transgressions. Indeed, so far as appears in 
the record before us, except for some conversation with 
Gerald about his school work and his “wanting to go to . . .  
Grand Canyon with his father,” the points to which the 
judge directed his attention were little different from 
those that would be involved in determining any charge of 
violation of a penal statute.  The essential difference 
between Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that 
safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald’s 
case. The summary procedure as well as the long 
commitment was possible because Gerald was [fifteen] 
years of age instead of over [eighteen].172 
Also as noted, despite the efforts of the juvenile court to 
eliminate the stigmatization effect of delinquency adjudications, in 
most cases the stigma attaches in a serious way.173  Records of 
delinquency, when revealed to the government, the armed forces, 
and sometimes even private employers, could seriously impact a 
child’s future. 
The Court in Gault discussed studies invalidating the 
conception of the juvenile court judge as a wise father figure.174  
The studies demonstrated that the essentials of due process would 
 
 170. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
 171. Gault, 387 U.S. at 29-30. 
 172. Id. at 28-29 (internal citations omitted). 
 173. Id. at 23-24. 
 174. Id. at 25-26. 
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contribute more to the realization of a therapy possibility than the 
antiquated notion of a gentle judge with a parens patriae attitude.175  
As such studies surfaced, it became clear that due process should 
be inserted into the juvenile court system. 
After Gault, however, the court was not finished considering 
the application of due process rights.  In 1970, almost eighty years 
after the first juvenile court statute in Illinois, the Supreme Court 
held that in some delinquency proceedings juveniles, like adults, 
were entitled to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.176  
As with the other cases, Winship was limited to the adjudicatory 
stage of proceeding and did not expressly speak to the dispositional 
stage.177  It is unclear what types of cases were affected by the 
decision.  In addition, in limiting its application, Justice Brennan 
expressly stated that “we intimate no view concerning the 
constitutionality of the New York procedures governing children 
‘in need of supervision.’”178 
Nevertheless, the application of Kent, Gault, and Winship 
dramatically shifted the approach in juvenile proceedings and the 
philosophical view of the courts that continued to place issues of 
due process potentially in conflict with the parens patriae best 
interests standard expressed by the early founders of the juvenile 
court system.  Despite the potential conflict, it was clear that the 
Supreme Court held the view that the accommodation to 
fundamentals and principals of due process would not stand in the 
way of any legitimate goal of the courts to consider the children’s 
best interests.179 
As a final matter, in 1971 the Supreme Court decided that 
despite the previous decisions, juveniles were not necessarily 
entitled to all constitutional rights assured adults, but that the 
Court in Gault and Winship had “attempted to strike a judicious 
balance.”180  In McKeiver, the Court decided that a juvenile was not 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.181  The plurality’s opinion in 
part rests on the concern that if jury trials were required in 
delinquency proceedings, then such proceedings would be 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 177. Id. at 359. 
 178. Id. at 359 n.1. 
 179. Id. at 366-67. 
 180. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 15 (Pa. 1967)). 
 181. Id. at 545. 
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indistinguishable from adult trials.182  In addition, Justice Blackmun 
stated that a jury trial “will remake the juvenile proceeding into a 
fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has 
been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective 
proceeding.”183  While recognizing that the juvenile court system 
had its deficiencies and failures, the plurality did not believe a jury 
trial would address any of these, nor that a jury trial would 
necessarily lead to better fact finding.184  The McKeiver opinion 
reflects the Court’s ultimate unwillingness to throw out the 
philosophical backbone of the juvenile court process and 
demonstrates that there is much good to be found in the 
traditional, informal proceedings. 
Thus, nearly seventy years after its inception, the “juvenile 
court philosophy” had undergone a revolution recognizing that in 
some circumstances children are entitled to due process rights and 
to some rights of their own, separate from the State and separate 
from their parents.  Later case law reaffirms many of these changes 
and further clarifies what the philosophical shift entails, as noted 
particularly in Minnesota.185  The definitions of rights, procedures, 
responsibilities and philosophy, however, are more clearly 
implemented and reflected in the initial consideration and 
development of procedural rules attempting to apply the 
constitutional protections afforded by various cases. 
VII. MINNESOTA DUE PROCESS—PROCEDURAL RULES COME TO THE 
JUVENILE COURT 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Minnesota courts began 
responding to the development of case law throughout the country 
and, in particular, to U.S. Supreme Court decisions looking at 
juvenile court procedures.  This response included evaluating the 
need for uniform procedures in delinquency cases.186  These initial 
procedural rules attempted to balance the child-centered juvenile 
court parens patriae view with the procedural due process 
requirements and constitutionally imposed rights in an effort to 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 547. 
 185. See infra Part VII. 
 186. See, e.g., State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 449-52, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677-78 
(1973) (harmonizing Minnesota statutory and case law regarding juvenile court 
procedures with federal and state case law and an Arizona statute). 
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continue the overall juvenile court philosophy in dealing with 
children.187  The desire for judges to continue to be well versed in 
law as well as psychology, sociology, and child development was 
considered throughout the development of procedural rules. 
To understand the development of procedural rules and the 
subsequent impact on procedural and substantive due process, it is 
important to be aware that in the late 1960s the Minnesota juvenile 
court structure was determined statutorily by individual counties.188  
At that time, district courts were deemed to be the higher level trial 
courts, with municipal and county courts continuing to be viewed 
as lower level trial courts.  By statute in Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties—the two counties in Minnesota with the largest 
populations and the vast majority of juvenile delinquency cases—
the juvenile courts were a division of the district court.189  Each of 
these courts was effectively run and controlled by an individual 
judge. 190  In each court, the judge had been the only juvenile court 
judge presiding there for many years prior to that time. 191  These 
judges suggested that the juvenile courts had specific procedural 
rules that incorporated due process and equal protection rights.192  
Juvenile court judges in most other Minnesota counties, however, 
played a far less specialized role because the probate court also 
served as the juvenile court and may have had jurisdiction over 
other minor offenses.193 
Interestingly enough, the statutes concerning the juvenile 
court system gave no specific statutory authority to the judges to 
create any specific rules applicable to juvenile court proceedings.194  
 
 187. See, e.g., id. at 444-51, 212 N.W.2d at 674-77 (analyzing how to protect 
constitutional rights when a juvenile confesses while in the juvenile court system 
but may later be tried as an adult); Loyd v. Youth Conservation Comm’n, 287 
Minn. 12, 17-19, 177 N.W.2d 555, 558-59 (1970) (explaining that a juvenile 
adjudicated a delinquent is not entitled to the same procedural due process 
standards as a juvenile convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor). 
 188. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 1 (1965) (repealed 1978). 
 189. Id. § 260.021, subds. 2-3. 
 190. Id.  Subdivisions 2 and 3 established special district court positions for 
members of the bench in Ramsey, St. Louis, and Hennepin counties and required 
these judges to devote themselves primarily to the juvenile court duties.  Id. 
 191. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 817. 
 192. See generally id. 
 193. MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 4.  This particular juvenile court program 
for smaller counties was originally established by law in 1961, and the 1965 
amendment simply raised the minimum population.  MINN. STAT. § 260.021, subd. 
4 (1961). 
 194. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-260.56 (1961). 
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The probate court, on the other hand, did have such enabling 
statutes, and in 1969 the Minnesota Probate Court Judges 
Association, made up of all judges hearing juvenile court cases in 
the eighty-five greater Minnesota counties, reviewed, drafted, 
passed, and approved juvenile court procedural rules.195  These 
judges agreed to abide by the rules, known as the Rules of Procedure 
for Juvenile Court Proceedings in Minnesota Probate-Juvenile Courts,196 
whenever exercising jurisdiction as juvenile court judges.197 
Nevertheless, judges in Hennepin and Ramsey counties failed 
to approve or abide by these rules.198  There were many reasons for 
this, including the fact that the metropolitan area saw a high 
volume of juvenile cases.199  These judges created their own set of 
procedural rules for application within the Hennepin and Ramsey 
county courts.200  The rules and versions of the juvenile court rules 
of procedure for Hennepin and Ramsey counties were contained, 
respectively, in the Hennepin County Minnesota Juvenile Court Bench 
Book201 and the Ramsey County Juvenile Court Bench Book.202 
As a result of these two different approaches from 1969-1983, 
the procedural rules applicable to juvenile court proceedings 
varied from county to county and between the metropolitan area 
and rural areas.  The rights of juveniles or adults in dependency or 
neglect proceedings were established by the county of the case’s 
venue because the different procedural rights granted to juveniles 
often had significant impact on primary substantive rights.  The 
critical issue, however, was that while these two sets of rules 
purportedly were for procedural reasons, the reality is that they did 
grant and/or interpret significant substantive rights.  For example, 
[T]he rules in Greater Minnesota specifically 
delineated certain rights including the right to counsel, 
the right to remain silent, and other basic rights.  The 
Hennepin and Ramsey County rules incorporated some 
specific guarantees within other rules, but they did not 
 
 195. MINN. JUVENILE JUDGES ASS’N, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT 
PROCEEDINGS IN MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at v. 
 198. See Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 818. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See infra notes 204-05. 
 201. HENNEPIN COUNTY MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT BENCH BOOK: DISTRICT 
COURT—JUVENILE DIVISION (4th ed. 1977). 
 202. EDWARD J. CLEARY & KATHLEEN R. GEARIN, RAMSEY COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 
BENCH BOOK (1982). 
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contain a separate division for rights of the children.  
Thus, substantive rights, such as right to counsel and the 
right to remain silent, were much more explicitly spelled 
out in the Greater Minnesota probate and juvenile court 
rules. 
At the same time, the Hennepin County rules 
specifically addressed discovery issues.  The procedural 
rules used by the counties of Greater Minnesota did not 
address discovery issues and did not interrelate with the 
procedural rules from other courts. 203 
Thus, for almost fifteen years the procedural rules, and 
therefore the substantive rights of children and adults in 
delinquency and neglect (now CHIPS) proceedings, were in fact 
determined by the location within the state where the respondent 
found himself.204 
Finally, in 1980 the Minnesota Legislature authorized the 
creation of procedural rules that would apply to all juvenile court 
proceedings within the state.205  Effectively, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the first uniform rules of juvenile procedure for the 
state in 1983.206  These rules, though amended and delineated in 
many ways, continue in one way or another to rule juvenile court 
procedures to this day. 
VIII.   FINALLY UNIFORMITY AND A CONTINUAL BALANCING ACT 
The committee that created the juvenile court rules divided 
them into “delinquency rules” and “juvenile protection rules” to 
emphasize the two separate objectives.207  The latter set of rules 
broadened the categories of protections to cases involving “all 
dependency, neglect, neglected and in foster care, termination of 
parental rights and review of out of home placement matters.”208  
This expansion marked the initial establishment of procedural 
rules applicable to all juvenile court cases since the legislative 
 
 203. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 818-19 (citations omitted). 
 204. WRIGHT S. WALLING, THE JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE IN MINNESOTA 1 (1984). 
 205. See MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 (1982) (requiring the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to promulgate rules of procedure for the juvenile court); ROBERT SCOTT & 
JOHN O. SONSTENG, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 12, at 
ix (3d ed. 2002). 
 206. MINN. R. JUV. P.; see also SCOTT & SONSTENG, supra note 205, at ix. 
 207. SCOTT & SONSTENG, MINNESOTA supra note 205, 13, at 1. 
 208. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 37.01. 
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creation of the terms “dependant” and “neglected” children nearly 
eighty years before.209 
The framers of the new juvenile court rules created two set of 
rules because they wanted to distinguish delinquency cases where, 
because of the criminal nature of the delinquent acts, both the 
procedural and substantive rights were critical from the juvenile 
protection matters where other doctrines and philosophies come 
into play. 210  In creating these categories, the framers struggled to 
balance conflicting issues.  On one side of the debate were the 
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and right to 
counsel; on the other side was the philosophical concept based on 
“juvenile court philosophy,” including the need for swift 
proceedings responding to emergency situations and the 
incorporation of long held notion of parens patriae.211  In struggling 
to achieve the balance, the framers attempted to develop a system 
which would reflect all of those things.  In doing so, a procedural 
system unlike any other within the court system of Minnesota was 
created. 
As an example of the sometimes subtle distinction 
between the rules of civil and criminal procedure and the 
rules of juvenile court procedure, rather than being a 
party to an action, a person or entity has a “right to 
participate.”  Instead of applying the civil discovery rules 
or the criminal discovery rules, a different set of rules 
applying to pretrial discovery was created.  At the same 
time, in an effort to move matters along, time limits were 
set within all of the rules to recognize that decisions in 
children’s lives need to be made quickly.212 
Since the original 1983 statutes, Minnesota has enacted 
numerous statutory and rule changes.  “Dependency” and 
“Neglect” have been replaced by CHIPS;213 the rules themselves 
have been amended;214 and the statutes have been amended to 
 
 209. See 1905 Minn. Laws 418 (defining the terms “dependent child” and 
“neglected child”). 
 210. This distinction is illustrated by comparing MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 1-35 
(involving matters where a minor child had violated state or local law) with Rules 
37-65 (applying to matters not involving criminal juvenile misconduct). 
 211. Walling & Debele, supra note 10, at 820-21. 
 212. Id. at 821. 
 213. MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2004). 
 214. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. (last amended July 11, 2005); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 
(last amended Jan. 1, 2004). 
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reflect more openness and to make more matters public.215  All 
juvenile CHIPS proceedings and termination proceedings have, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court, been deemed to be opened 
to the public.216  All records in those proceedings other than those 
sealed by the court have also been opened.217 
Further delineation has been taken and created in the rules 
under the headings of the “Delinquency Proceedings” and the 
“Juvenile Protection Matters”; and a substantial struggle has 
continued in an attempt to define the amount of involvement that 
the State should have in those “status offenses,” which are actions 
deemed to be wrong by children but not deemed to be criminal by 
adults.  The continuing tension between the rights of the 
individuals involved, the theoretical view of parens patriae, and 
action by the State, all continue to cause conflict, disagreement, 
and discrepancy.  At the same time, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
continues to work with its appointed task forces on developing, 
refining, and honing procedural rules to apply to all aspects of 
juvenile court. 
As recently as January 2005, Minnesota became the first state 
in the country to have procedural rules which apply specifically to 
adoption cases.218  Although adoptions have been part of the 
juvenile court milieu for many years, the connection and 
interrelationship between other aspects of juvenile court and in 
fact family court have not always been clear.  This is particularly 
true with respect to procedural rules. 
The advent, however, of time limits and the development of 
permanency placement requirements and options in the juvenile 
court have further highlighted the reality that families and children 
are difficult to place within a specific category of the court 
system.219  The issues do not lend themselves to easy categorizing or 
solutions.  For example, the permanency option of permanent 
 
 215. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, 260B.171, 260C.163, 260C.171. 
 216. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 8.04 (denying public access to the records except 
for video or audio tapes describing neglect, reports of abuse or neglect, and HIV 
test results). 
 217. Id. advisory committee cmt. (“Hearings or portions of hearings may be 
closed by the presiding judge only in exceptional circumstances.”). 
 218. See MINN. R. ADOPTION P.; see also MINN. SUPREME COURT JUVENILE PROT. 
RULES COMM., FINAL REPORT AND PROPOSED RULES OF ADOPTION PROCEDURE 3 
(2004) (“[T]he Subcommittee contacted other states to solicit copies of their 
Adoption Rules, but learned that no such rules exist.”)(on file with the William 
Mitchell Law Review). 
 219. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201 (2004). 
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legal and physical custody to a relative220 bridged the jurisdiction of 
family law statutes under Minnesota Statutes chapter 518 and of 
adoption law statutes in Minnesota Statutes section 259.23.221  
These issues make it clear that delinquency cases, CHIPS cases, and 
children’s best interests all transcend jurisdictional definition, such 
as the distinction between family law and adoption law, and that 
the interconnections between them are extremely important, and 
still evolving. 
As a result of the evolution of and importance of adoption law, 
as well as the continuing interest in and litigation around various 
adoption questions, Minnesota recognized the need for uniform 
adoption rules.  Hence the new adoption rules, which attempt to 
define both what they apply to and when they apply.222  Of note, 
and for further discussion in other articles, is the fact that the 
adoption rules take more of a civil discovery perspective than the 
juvenile protection rules or the juvenile delinquency rules.223  
Exactly how all of these will be interpreted remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the 
basis for decisions on responsibilities, charging, dispositions, 
notice, right to counsel, etc., are all directly impacted and often 
controlled by uniform procedural rules.  The rights of respondents 
in the juvenile court system have changed dramatically as a result.  
Minnesota once again, as it did in the initial stages of the juvenile 
court, is leading the way in the development of procedural rules 
that impact substantive rights in all aspects of the jurisdictional 
basis in juvenile court. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Some one-hundred years after the first juvenile court statute 
formally created the juvenile court jurisdiction in Minnesota, the 
issues that surround society’s decisions on dealing with children, 
families, and the creation and destruction of those families from 
the legal perspective remain largely the same.  While it took eighty 
years to recognize that children should have certain constitutional 
rights when they are being removed from the home, during the last 
twenty-five years the courts and society have struggled just as 
 
 220. Id. § 260C.201, subd. 1. 
 221. Id. § 260C.101 (dealing with jurisdiction in juvenile matters). 
 222. MINN. R. ADOPTION P. 
 223. Compare MINN. R. ADOPTION P., with MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P., and MINN. R. 
JUV. DEL. P. 
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diligently to balance the rights of the individual with the needs of 
families and children.  It is impossible to overstate the impact of 
the last twenty-five or thirty years on the philosophical issues raised 
one-hundred or one-hundred-fifty years ago by the creators of the 
“juvenile court philosophy.”  The reality is that regardless of the 
procedures applied, the substantive rights involved, or the power of 
the State, the goal is and should continue to be to first define and 
then implement what is in the individual “best interests” of the 
child appearing before the juvenile court.  While the procedures 
have continued to evolve, so too has the juvenile court’s impact on 
the individual child, family, and the whole of society.  The goals of 
the juvenile court remain vitally important and critical to society’s 
view of dealing with its children. 
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